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Abstract
South Africa’s readmission into the multilateral trade system in the early 1990s 
was one of the key events that marked the end of decades of international 
ostracism brought about by the country’s apartheid policies. by participating 
in the uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations and acceding to the 
marrakesh Agreement of the GAtt/Wto in 1994, South Africa agreed to 
liberalise its trade policies in line with the rules-based global trade regime after 
decades of estrangement from the GAtt operations and disciplines. Although 
South Africa had taken part in all the previous rounds of multilateral trade 
liberalisation, years of international isolation prevented the country from 
benefiting from the considerable liberalisation attained in the successive pre-
uruguay round negotiations. even so, it appears that the uruguay round had a 
significant political and economic impact on South Africa. the normalisation of 
South Africa’s trade relations and the reinstatement of its trade prerogatives within 
the Wto elicited a favourable disposition towards the country. trade reforms 
implemented in line with uruguay round commitments laid the foundation for 
major changes in the South African economy. South Africa, however, still has a 
long way to go before it can achieve its long-term goal of becoming a globally 
competitive, outward-oriented manufacturing and services economy.       
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1 INTRODUCTION 
South Africa’s reacceptance into the multilateral trade system in the early 1990s 
marked the end of decades of international isolation brought about by the country’s 
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apartheid policies. This article explores the country’s role in the Uruguay Round 
(UR) of multilateral trade negotiations, which began in 1986 and concluded in 1994. 
By signing the Marrakesh Agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1994, South Africa signalled its commitment not only to liberalise its 
trade policies in accordance with the rules-based international trade system, but also 
to formalise its credentials as a fully fledged trading nation, following many years 
of operating outside the GATT disciplines. Although South Africa had taken part 
in all the previous rounds of multilateral trade liberalisation, years of international 
isolation prevented the country from benefiting from the considerable liberalisation 
attained in successive pre-UR negotiations. The UR had a significant political and 
economic impact on South Africa: the normalisation of South Africa’s trade relations 
within the WTO elicited a favourable disposition towards the country, while trade 
reforms implemented in line with UR commitments laid the foundation for major 
changes in the South African economy. This country, however, still has a long way 
to go before it can achieve its long-term goal of becoming a globally competitive, 
outward-oriented manufacturing and services economy.       
The article is structured into four parts: the first places the UR of multilateral 
trade negotiations within a global historical setting. The second provides a 
comprehensive examination of South Africa’s role in the UR. The third analyses the 
impact of the country’s participation in the UR on the South African economy. The 
article concludes with a discussion of some of the key challenges local policymakers 
will have to tackle in the future, following the implementation of the country’s UR 
commitments.
2 THE URUGUAY ROUND IN GLOBAL CONTEXT  
The UR of trade negotiations, which began in September 1986, came about as a 
result of the growing realisation across the world (in the 1980s) that the global 
economy was undergoing structural changes that necessitated a fundamental review 
of the manner in which the traditional GATT structure was operating (Winham 
1999: 163). It was this recognition that inspired the United States (US) to take the 
lead in calling for a new round of trade negotiations. Notwithstanding their initial 
opposition to the launch of a new negotiating round, developing countries played 
an active part in building momentum towards the UR (see Wilkinson and Scott 
2008). Moreover, domestic considerations played a key part in the decision of 
most developing countries to agree to new negotiations. Faced with a devastating 
recession and debt crisis, which precipitated a sharp increase in debt repayments 
and a consequent decline in imports, the governments of many developing countries 
recognised that they had a stake in expanded exports and an open trade system 
(Winham 1994: 169).
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Although developed and developing countries were driven by diverse concerns, 
they shared a common objective – that of maintaining the multilateral trading 
system (Schott 1994). The UR was the most extensive and ambitious negotiating 
round undertaken in the history of the GATT: its significance lay with its aim of 
incorporating trade in agriculture and textiles into the GATT rules and disciplines. 
It was also notable for its introduction of new issues into the GATT negotiations, 
namely trade in services, investment, and intellectual property rights. It was largely 
around these issues that divisions between the developed and developing countries, 
led by Brazil and India, revolved during the pre-negotiation phase of the UR 
(Wilkinson and Scott 2008: 502).  Most developing nations were opposed to the 
inclusion of these new issues, fearing that ‘the GATT rules developed for the new 
issues could be used by the industrialised countries to overwhelm their fledgling 
industries and to undermine domestic policies that the developing countries 
considered critical to their national economic development’ (Spero and Hart 1997: 
84). These nations wanted to ensure that, if they were forced to make concessions in 
these areas, the developed countries would reciprocate by making real concessions 
in areas of importance to them, such as textiles, clothing and agriculture. Ironically, 
the sectors where developing countries sought concessions were precisely those 
that were considered ‘sensitive’ in the developed countries’ markets, in terms of the 
GATT regulatory regime. 
The GATT provided for an agreement – the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) – that 
‘allowed the developed countries to restrain imports either through the negotiation 
of bilateral quotas or through the application of flexible safeguard measures’ 
(McDonald 1998: 136). The MFA prohibited developed countries from imposing 
quotas on imports from other developed countries – only the imports of developing 
countries were affected. The issue of agriculture generated the most acrimonious 
disagreements among the negotiating parties during the UR. At the heart of the 
disputes were divergent interests over the pace and level of structural adjustment 
needed to reform agricultural policies, and over areas that required regulation 
(McDonald 1998: 206).  
The UR agriculture negotiations were influenced by a number of factors, 
including a crisis in the global agricultural system (exemplified by burgeoning trade 
disputes between the US and the European Union (EU)), a recognition by the EU 
that its protectionist and interventionist agricultural policy needed to be reformed 
to control an increasingly unsustainable agricultural budget, and a realisation that 
the success of the UR depended partly on the EU making agricultural concessions 
in order to accommodate the needs of its trade partners (McDonald 1998: 206). 
The key aim of the EU was to cut domestic subsidies to the level where supply and 
demand in the global market would be in equilibrium. Although the EU wanted 
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to reduce the general level of domestic support, it nevertheless sought to maintain 
flexibility in the implementation of this provision, thereby allowing for domestic 
subsidies, border measures and export subsidies to be altered accordingly.  
The EU believed that cutting domestic support would lead inexorably to a 
reduction in border restrictions or export subsidies. The US disagreed with the EU, 
arguing instead for an application of reduction measures to all the policy components 
(McDonald 1998: 206). The US position enjoyed the support of the Cairns Group2 
of low-cost agricultural exporters – a very influential coalition of developed and 
developing countries, that pushed very hard for an end to agricultural protectionism 
in developed countries.  
The final UR Agreement on Agriculture represented a compromise between 
the US and EU positions, and did not go far enough in addressing the concerns of 
developing countries in respect of export subsidy reductions, trade-distorting forms 
of domestic support and improved market access (Capling 2001: 145). Of all the 
issues considered in the UR of trade negotiations, agricultural reform was the most 
pressing for most developing countries. The key concern of developing countries 
was the high agricultural subsidy support provided by governments of industrialised 
countries to their farmers. Such subsidies restricted access to developed country 
markets for products in which developing countries had a comparative advantage. 
For most developing countries, the UR represented a setback: they gained little or 
nothing from it, despite assurances made by developed countries to provide them 
with larger market access for their agricultural products, and clothing and textile 
exports, as well as the necessary technical assistance to implement their WTO 
obligations (Narlikar 2005: 67–71 and 107–108).  
Not only did the UR fall short of delivering meaningful results on issues of interest 
to poor countries, it also failed to deal satisfactorily with systemic issues such as 
the GATT articles, safeguards, subsidies, multilateral trade negotiation agreements, 
special and differential treatment, and the enforcement of rights and obligations 
(Onimode 2000: 185–187). The least-developed countries (LDCs), in particular, had 
to contend with new trade issues – trade in services, intellectual property rights, 
and investment – that they did not understand and around which they were not 
adequately prepared to negotiate.
At the conclusion of the UR, developing countries made market-opening 
concessions that went further than the unilateral liberalising measures they were 
already undertaking. This was in exchange for the removal of developed-country 
barriers to their exports, and the legal enforceability and security of the resulting 
market access. In turn, the final UR agreement provided for the phasing out of 
the MFA and the removal of all quotas over ten years. It also set out measures 
that would liberalise trade in agriculture, and committed all countries – with the 
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exception of the LDCs – to eliminate all quantitative restrictions on industrial goods 
and agricultural imports. It enjoined developing countries to adopt appropriate 
protection for intellectual property rights, while ruling that trade in services ought to 
be subjected to multilateral trade disciplines in the WTO (Woolcock 1999: 32–34). 
It also stipulated new procedures for dispute settlement, and set up the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism, the purpose of which was to subject the trade policies and 
practices of WTO member states to scrutiny.    
3 SOUTH AFRICA AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 
The April 1994 signing of the Marrakesh Agreement – which marked the successful 
conclusion of the UR of trade negotiations of the GATT/WTO – by 122 countries, 
represented what economist Alan Hirsch (1995: 41) termed a ‘doubled new discipline’ 
for South Africa in the global trading regime: taking place a fortnight before the first 
democratic elections in this country, it marked not only South Africa’s reacceptance 
into the international community of nations, but also its accession to the new WTO 
regime. South Africa’s role in the UR cannot be clearly understood without reference 
to how the country’s trade policy evolved in the post-war period. In 1948, South 
Africa was one of the original 23 signatories to the GATT. As a founder member of the 
GATT, South Africa participated in all the rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. 
Even so, the paramount question that exercised the minds of local policy makers 
over successive decades, was whether or not the country’s economic interests were 
being adequately served by the GATT. This ambivalent attitude towards the GATT 
regime was highlighted in submissions made by domestic commerce and industry 
to the Reynders Commission of Inquiry into South Africa’s export trade (Reynders 
Commission 1972). 
While South Africa saw the GATT as a crucial means of realising the post-war 
policy of international trade liberalisation, it was concerned that the concessions it 
was making in the international trade system were not being matched by the benefits 
it was deriving. There were doubts over whether the GATT took sufficient account 
of South Africa’s development needs and whether it was desirable (given these 
development imperatives) for South Africa to have to fulfil its GATT obligations to 
the same extent as the industrialised countries.  
In some respects, South Africa’s anxieties about the GATT reflected the 
country’s deeply ingrained suspicion of international institutions at the height of 
the apartheid era. Yet, more fundamentally, they also encapsulated South Africa’s 
perception that GATT disciplines were imposing undue constraints on the country’s 
domestic economic objectives – particularly its quest for national self-sufficiency. 
Notwithstanding its reservations about the GATT, the South African government 
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committed itself to continuing its participation in this institutional arrangement. 
Even so, decades of international ostracism brought about by its apartheid policies 
meant that South Africa was able to operate beyond the reaches of the GATT rules, 
and the country remained largely outside the substantial liberalisation achieved in 
the successive pre-UR negotiating rounds. As Hirsch (1995: 41) states: 
The constraints of full membership rested on the fact that having been an international 
outlaw for at least a decade, South Africa had been allowed to operate beyond the reaches 
of GATT rules. With GATT as the apolitical international agreement par excellence, the 
sanctions which operated against South Africa from the mid-1980s were illegal in terms 
of GATT rules. For this reason, countries which maintained sanctions against South 
Africa in defiance of GATT were understandably reluctant to resort to GATT rules when 
they believed that South Africa was operating outside of the GATT framework.
As such, South Africa was able to maintain relatively high tariffs and several 
quantitative restrictions on its imports, to sustain its inward-looking trade and 
industrial policies for many years. The country’s isolation from the GATT processes 
over the years, however, robbed it of the benefits brought about by structural changes 
in the global economy, typified by trends towards globalisation of production, 
investment, technology and trade flows (Matona 1994: 15). Indeed, the deficiencies of 
South Africa’s import substitution industrial strategy had increasingly become clear 
in the 1970s. Even so, worsening external circumstances – including an international 
trade embargo against the country – made it difficult for South African authorities 
to introduce export-oriented policies. This, in turn, ‘left South Africa trailing behind 
the newly industrialising countries in terms of international competitiveness and 
export growth’ (Matona 1994: 15). For example, although in the mid-1970s the 
proportion of manufactured exports to gross domestic product (GDP) in both South 
Africa and Malaysia stood at 6 to 7 per cent, by 2004 this figure had risen to 80 per 
cent in Malaysia but to only 12 per cent in South Africa (Rodrik 2006: 7).     
South Africa participated in the UR as a developed country and conformed 
to developed-country rules. Two reasons account for this classification: the 
first concerns this country’s international role in the immediate post-war period. 
Firstly, South Africa had been an active participant in the shaping of the post-war 
international order – through participation in World War II on the side of the Western 
Allied Forces and in the reconstruction efforts that saw the emergence of the United 
Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. South Africa was seen, and viewed 
itself, as an integral part of the ‘Western bloc’ in the post-war geo-political and 
economic realignments (see Nolutshungu 1994: 129–136). Secondly, the country 
was classified as developed, because it conformed to the World Bank criteria for 
developed economies.3 The issue of South Africa’s classification was debated 
during a review of the country’s trade policy in 1993. In its opening statement, the 
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South African trade delegation had mooted the possibility of having the country 
reclassified as a developing country. This proposal was immediately rebuffed by 
the US, which reminded the delegation that, as a founding member of the GATT, 
South Africa had never been regarded as a developing country (Department of Trade 
and Industry 1993: 2). For this reason the US, supported by the EU and Japan, 
refused to categorise South Africa as a developing nation; instead, the country 
was recognised as a transitional economy, which implied a degree of flexibility 
regarding the pace of trade policy reform. The US stance in relation to South Africa 
accorded with an increasingly uncompromising and unaccommodating attitude on 
the part of developed countries towards developing countries. In the course of the 
UR, developed countries put enormous pressure on developing countries to reduce 
tariffs substantially, while the EU proclaimed that it would not treat Hong Kong, 
Singapore and South Korea as developing countries in its implementation of the 
commitments of the UR (Hartridge 1994: 175–176).
The designation of South Africa as a developed country implied that the country 
had little recourse to ‘special and differential treatment’ in the WTO environment. 
The possibility and desirability of South Africa claiming developing country status in 
the WTO has been a subject of intense domestic debate. South Africa has numerous 
attributes of semi-peripheral economies. Its economy is characterised by a huge 
reliance on traditional commodity exports and imports of capital goods, as well as 
unequal income distribution and high unemployment levels. It is typified by highly 
competitive sectors – such as the financial and automotive sectors – and a relatively 
well-developed economic infrastructure. Yet the bulk of South Africa’s industry was 
massively protected from international competition, thanks to the import substitution 
policies pursued by previous apartheid governments. The continued classification of 
South Africa as a developed economy has remained problematic in the context of 
the Doha Round of global trade negotiations, with one Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) official labelling it an ‘historical injustice’.4 South Africa has argued 
for a review of its classification as a developed economy within the WTO, which it 
has blamed for, among other things, the uneven development of the southern African 
region (Amandla December 2008).  
This country supported the UR of multilateral trade negotiations from the outset. 
During the late 1980s, the work of the DTI’s multilateral trade relations division was 
dominated by the UR negotiations (Department of Trade and Industry 1989: 11–12). 
Nonetheless, South Africa’s trade delegation was overwhelmed by the daunting UR 
negotiating agenda, and struggled to keep up with developments in the numerous 
key areas of parallel negotiations. South Africa’s negotiating posture, therefore, 
was ‘defensive’ (Hirsch 1995: 45). Inadequately prepared, and confronted with the 
wide-ranging scope and intricacy of the UR agenda, this country had little chance of 
influencing the negotiations on several issues (Matona 1994: 16). 
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South Africa submitted its initial UR offer on tariff reductions in 1990. The 
tabling of this offer proceeded amid tensions between the South African government 
and the private sector. To be sure, the offer was ‘developed by the government and 
more-or-less imposed on the private sector without an adequate formal process of 
consultation’ (Hirsch 1995: 50). This was partly a function of the ‘the sanctions-
inspired secrecy with which the previous government conducted international 
relations’ (Matona 1994: 16). It was also a demonstration of the growing lack of 
legitimacy of the apartheid government’s economic policymaking, which was 
overshadowed by the escalating internal political crisis. Following a review of 
South Africa’s trade and industrial policies, it was ‘found South Africa’s offer did 
not provide an adequate base for a fundamental rationalisation of the tariff structure’ 
(Department of Trade and Industry 1993: 23). This necessitated the compiling of 
a revised offer that would comply with the UR objectives. South Africa tabled a 
revised offer in 1993, after the country’s trade policies were subjected to intense 
scrutiny in a GATT Council review – in which 40 countries participated – and 
questions were raised about ‘the complexity of the country’s tariff structure, the 
high levels of certain import tariffs, export incentives and subsidies, local content 
programmes, import control and the surcharge on imports’ (Department of Trade and 
Industry 1993: 22). The submission of a revised offer coincided with the beginning 
of South Africa’s transition to democracy and attendant calls by the African National 
Congress on the then ruling National Party government to broaden the number of 
participants in the UR negotiations. Whereas very little formal consultation with 
domestic constituencies took place in putting together South Africa’s initial offer, 
the revised offer was formulated in conjunction with the National Economic Forum,5 
a technical group of the Southern African Customs Union and task groups of the 
automotive, textiles and clothing, and electronics industries (Hirsch 1995: 51).   
South Africa’s final, revised offer to the WTO comprised of a five-year tariff 
reduction and rationalisation programme, with the clothing, textiles and automotive 
sectors being the only exceptions to the five-year tariff liberalisation process – these 
sectors were given eight years to achieve the levels set out in the WTO offer. The 
offer encompassed whittling down the number of tariff bands from just over 100 to 
6: these were made up of duties at the rates of 0, 5, 10, 15, 20 and 30 per cent. The 
offer also included: rationalising industrial tariff lines from around 12 500 to about 
1 000; reducing industrial tariffs by an average 33 per cent; slashing agricultural 
tariffs by an average 36 per cent; phasing out local content measures in the automotive 
industry; and abolishing the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS)6 by 1997. 
South Africa also undertook to cut average weighted import duties from 34 per 
cent to 17 per cent for consumption goods, 8 per cent to 4 per cent for intermediate 
goods, and 11 per cent to 5 per cent for capital goods. Other elements of the WTO 
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offer entailed raising the share of bound tariffs from under 20 per cent to slightly 
over 50 per cent and hiking the percentage of bound-zero-rated tariff lines to slightly 
over 25 per cent (see Cassim, Onyango and Van Seventer 2004: 9–11; Marais 1998: 
129; Matona 1994: 16).
South Africa also made market access commitments in the financial services 
sector – covering the banking, securities and insurance sectors (Anderson 1998: 
1–27). South Africa’s financial services liberalisation offer was based on three 
conditions: first, there was a desire to protect this country’s investors from 
‘unscrupulous foreign entities selling financial products from offshore locations’ 
(Anderson 1998: 10). Second, regulations were needed to level the playing fields 
between domestic and foreign financial institutions that established (or had already 
established) a commercial presence within South Africa’s domestic market. Third, a 
change of regulations was required to ensure that domestic financial institutions were 
not hindered by local regulations in their attempts to become more internationally 
competitive (Anderson 1998: 10). Substantively, South Africa’s financial services 
offer and commitments were far more liberal than those of most developing countries 
and comparable to those of developed nations.7  
4 THE IMPACT OF THE URUGUAY ROUND ON THE   
 SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY   
By agreeing to implement as a single undertaking all the agreements of the UR, South 
Africa committed itself to extensive trade policy changes. For local policymakers, 
the UR represented an opportunity to signal to the international community South 
Africa’s seriousness about trade reform. It also heralded a fundamental departure 
from the import substitution industrialisation policies that had underpinned the 
country’s economy for several decades.
Trade reforms carried out in the mid-1990s, in line with WTO commitments, 
succeeded in opening up the country’s previously inward-looking economy. Import 
surcharges were abolished. The GEIS was phased out in 1995, in keeping with South 
Africa’s WTO obligations. In agriculture, quantitative restrictions were converted to 
tariffs, followed by a decrease in the range of ad valorem tariffs. The conversion of 
quantitative restrictions to tariffs began in 1992 and was completed in 1994, and 
by the end of the 1990s agricultural tariffs were generally low – barring ‘sensitive’ 
commodities such as sugar (40 per cent), dairy (20 per cent), mutton (50 per cent) 
and wheat (20 per cent).  
The tariff structure was simplified and rationalised. South Africa’s average tariff 
declined from 15 per cent in 1996 to 8 per cent in 2003. South Africa’s eight-digit 
tariff lines were reduced from 12 500 in 1990 to 7 900 in 2000 and 6 618 in 2008. 
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The share of zero-rated tariff lines grew from 32 per cent in 1996 to 45 per cent in 
2000 and to 54 per cent by 2008. The number of tariff bands declined from 200 in 
the early 1990s, to 100 in 2006. The gradual opening up of the economy was also 
evidenced by the degree of import penetration. The share of duty-free imports grew 
sharply from 60 per cent in 1996 to 66 per cent in 2000, although only a minimal 
increase to 68 per cent was recorded in 2003 (see Cassim, Onyango and Van Seventer 
2004a: 9–11; Cassim, Onyango and Van Seventer 2004b: 2–4; Department of Trade 
and Industry 2008a: 3–14).
Besides multilateral liberalisation, trade reform has been facilitated by the 
bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements South Africa concluded with key 
trade partners. Since the early 1990s, South Africa has signed preferential accords 
with several trade partners, including the EU, the Southern African Development 
Community, the European Free Trade Association countries,8 and the Mercosur 
regional bloc.9 South Africa has also been engaged in bilateral trade negotiations 
with the US10 and India, and there have been proposals to consider undertaking 
similar negotiations with China, Nigeria, Japan and Turkey. Furthermore, the 
country has been involved in negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
as part of the SADC-EPA group. Trade liberalisation has, therefore, been aimed not 
only at improving access for South African goods and services to traditional markets 
(Europe and North America), but also at exposing the country to new markets 
(Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East).  
A cursory examination of South African trade performance reveals an 
increasingly robust and resilient export sector. Trade reform has enabled this 
country to specialise and invest more in competitive industrial sectors and to source 
cheaper inputs for its uncompetitive sectors (Business Day 16 September 2003). 
Between 1992 and 2006, South African manufacturing exports grew by 13 per cent 
per annum in real terms, albeit from a low base (Hanival and Gonzalez-Nuñez 2008: 
16). However, notwithstanding this export growth, South Africa’s aggregate export 
performance still lags behind those of other major developing countries such as 
China, India and Brazil (see Table 1).
Not only have South African manufactured exports grown, they have also become 
diversified: although South Africa’s export basket remains dominated (as was the case 
in 1992) by mining and basic processed goods, exports of advanced manufactures 
grew to make up nearly 22 per cent of total exports in 2006, compared to 7 per cent 
in 1992 (Hanival and Gonzalez-Nuñez 2008: 16). Export performance has been 
bolstered partly by the implementation of sector-specific support programmes such 
as the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP).11 Thanks to the MIDP, the 
automotive sector recorded an annual average export growth of 36 per cent between 
1995 and 2002, and sustained investment growth during this period (Business Day
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Table 1: Growth of trade of key developing countries, 1992 2006 
     (US$ million)







Brazil 137 806 91 343 18.78 10.44
China 968 936 791 461 29.49 26.58
India 126 126 185 385 23.27 28.99
South Africa 53 169 69 184 13.74 23.39
Source: Hanival and Gonzalez-Nuñez (2008) 
 
Figure 1: Changes in SA exports and the trade balance, 1992 2006
Source:  Hanival and Gonzalez-Nunez (2008) 
thrown in at the deep end ... 
15
16 September 2003). Furthermore, the progressive opening up of the South African 
economy has been underscored by the steady rise, since 1992, in the ratio of exports 
to GDP (see Figure 1). The UR had a significant impact on South Africa, both in terms 
of normalising the country’s international trade relations and in respect of reinstating 
its trade prerogatives within the WTO (Matona 1994: 17). The establishment of a 
democratic political order saw many countries becoming increasingly favourably 
disposed towards South Africa. Although it made commitments to the WTO as a 
‘developed’ country, there was some recognition among its trading partners that this 
categorisation was at odds with South Africa’s social and economic realities. In terms 
of social and economic indicators – such as income distribution, employment levels 
and human capital development – South Africa closely fits the profile of developing, 
not developed, countries. In recognition of these realities, the country was offered 
‘limited special concessions such as longer phase-in periods in agriculture, textiles 
and clothing in the UR, as well as preferences outside of the GATT … ’ (Matona 
1994: 17). These concessions, which were sector-specific, were granted not only on 
merit, but also on a customised, case-by-case basis. Likewise, the US and Canada 
extended preferences to South Africa under the Generalised System of Preferences. 
South Africa was also offered membership of the Lomé Convention by the EU, 
although on a qualified basis.12      
The conclusion of the UR in April 1994 exerted significant pressure on South 
Africa to bolster its institutional and bureaucratic capacity in order to fulfil its WTO 
obligations. Not having been an active participant in GATT affairs, because the 
country had been ostracised internationally, South Africa lacked ‘the necessary 
internal institutions for administering GATT multilateral obligations and diplomacy’ 
and the country had to contend with the reality that its 
Department of Trade and Industry’s GATT section is certain to find that it is inadequately 
staffed, needs technical expertise, is in insufficient coordination with the Board on Trade 
and Tariffs and other relevant government departments, and has a poor liaison and 
image with the business, academic, legal and media communities affected by GATT/
WTO matters.  (Matona 1994: 18)   
South Africa’s accelerated trade liberalisation programme was initially criticised by 
sections of business and labour – especially those in sensitive sectors such as textiles 
and steel, in which tariffs had been lowered beyond what was required under the 
WTO (Marais 1998: 129). The labour unions feared that massive job losses would 
result from a hasty liberalisation process and were concerned that the government’s 
liberalisation policies had failed to take into account the impact of trade reform on 
employment in South Africa. While they generally conceded the importance of trade 
reform in integrating the country’s economy into the world economy, they were 
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concerned that poorly sequenced liberalisation would exacerbate South Africa’s 
already high unemployment levels (see Business Day 10 June 2000; Financial Mail 
19 May 2000).  
5 CONCLUSION   
This article has discussed South Africa’s role in the multilateral trading system, 
within the framework of the UR of trade negotiations. Overall, the trade reforms 
introduced in line with UR commitments laid the building blocks for significant 
changes in the South African economy. These changes have been reflected in a 
number of economic variables, including increased total factor productivity, exports 
and relatively low inflation (see Jonsson and Subramanian 2000: 1–34). But a number 
of important policy challenges remain: first, despite extensive tariff reform, South 
Africa’s tariff structure remains cumbersome.13 There is room for additional reform 
of the tariff structure, particularly in terms of strengthening linkages with industrial 
policy goals and providing greater clarity for economic agents (Department of Trade 
and Industry 2008b: 22).  
Second, South Africa must shed its poor international competitiveness. Although 
the country’s global competitiveness increased noticeably after 1994, in recent 
years it has again deteriorated in several respects. According to the World Economic 
Forum’s Global competitiveness report, South Africa’s competitiveness ranking – 
out of 134 national economies – slipped from 35th in 2005/6 to 45th in 2008/9 
(World Economic Forum 2008).14 
Third, South Africa must further improve its export performance: this is necessary 
if the country is to attain sustainable economic growth. South Africa’s proportion of 
exports to GDP decreased from 25 per cent in 2002 to 20 per cent in 2008 (Abedian 
2008: 9). This export ratio is far below those of South Africa’s emerging-market-
economy peers. To create a basis for sustained growth rates, South Africa has to 
raise its share of exports to GDP to around 35 per cent (Abedian 2008: 10). 
Fourth, there is a need to complement South Africa’s trade policy with a ‘well-
defined industrial strategy that is rooted in the comparative advantages of the 
country and enhanced by an appropriate mix of factor prices and foreign exchange 
policy’ (Abedian 2008: 7). Trade policy, supported by the country’s exchange rate 
policy, has been the key driver of economic liberalisation. However, in the absence 
of a credible industrial strategy over the past 15 years, South Africa’s industrial base 
has eroded, exemplified by the decline in the share of manufacturing as a proportion 
of GDP in recent years (Abedian 2008: 7). The introduction in 2007 by the South 
African government of a national industrial policy framework – which sets out the 
government’s approach to the industrial development of the South African economy 
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– was a clear admission of the limitations of the status quo (Department of Trade and 
Industry 2007). Although the South African economy has recorded steady growth 
and become more diversified since 1994, the country’s central industrialisation 
challenge remains to expand and diversify manufacturing and tradable services. 
This is particularly critical in light of the South African government’s policy goal of 
halving the country’s high unemployment rate by 2014.  
NOTES
1 The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of the anonymous reviewers, as well 
as those of Mzukisi Qobo, Peter Draper, Xavier Carim, Trudi Hartzenberg and Stuart 
Jones on an earlier draft of the article.    
2 The Cairns Group was made up of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Fiji, Indonesia, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and 
Uruguay.
3 Determined during the apartheid era largely on the basis of average per capita income 
(which then reflected the earning power of the white minority population), this 
classification stood in sharp contrast to the broader South African social and economic 
realities.  
4 Interview with an official of the Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, 24 
November 2008.   
5 Made up of representatives of government, business and labour (with informal 
representation of the African National Congress), the NEF was set up in 1992 to 
prevent a unilateral restructuring of the South African economy by the National Party 
government.  
6 Devised as an economy-wide scheme, based on value-added and local content, GEIS 
offered significant export incentives.    
7 Email correspondence from Xavier Carim to the author, 2 March 2009.
8 Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.
9 Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.  
10 Trade talks between South Africa and the US collapsed amidst differences over the 
negotiating agenda. 
11 Unveiled in 1995, the MIDP is a package of incentives based on selective import duty 
restrictions. It provides significant subsidies to investment and exports in return for 
the production and sale of motor vehicles in the protected domestic market. It allows 
firms using local content in exports to import duty-free permits equivalent to the local 
content value of exports. Amid concerns that the MIDP flouted the rules of the WTO on 
subsidies, in 2005 the South African government instituted a review of the programme 
that resulted in its replacement by the WTO-compliant Automotive Production and 
Development Programme.  
12 Although South Africa was excluded from Lomé trade preferences and from the 
Stabex and Sysmin stabilisation funds, it was offered certain political benefits, regional 




13 It is worth pointing out, though, that South Africa’s tariff structure is not out of step with 
those of other trading nations, such as the US, EU, Mercosur and India.     
14 Factors cited by the report as responsible for South Africa’s plummeting global 
competitiveness include high levels of crime, poor public education and health systems, 
a decline in the quality of the country’s electricity supply, poor national savings, and 
labour market inflexibility.
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